An Analysis of the Critical Risk Factors in Oil and Gas Pipeline Projects using a Comprehensive Risk Management Framework by Kraidi, L et al.
 This paper was presented as a working paper at the ARCOM 2018 Conference, Belfast, 
UK, 3-5 September 2018.  Please contact the authors before citing. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL RISK FACTORS IN 
OIL AND GAS PIPELINE PROJECTS USING A 
COMPREHENSIVE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Layth Kraidi1, Raj Shah, Wilfred Matipa and Fiona Borthwick 
Department of the Built Environment, Faculty of Engineering and Technology, Liverpool John Moores 
University, Byrom Street Campus, Liverpool, L3 3AF, UK 
Risk Factors (RFs) associated with the design, construction and operation of Oil and Gas 
Pipeline (OGP) projects have a serious impact on the safety of a project.  The limitations 
of the effective risk analysis techniques due to a lack of reliable risk data - particularly in 
insecure countries like Iraq where OGPs are suffering from sabotage attacks - frequently 
cause great challenges in the attempt to mitigate these risk factors and provide a 
systematic risk management system.  This paper, therefore, aims to analyse OGPs' RFs 
more accurately using a more systematic and holistic Risk Management Framework 
(RMF).  The RMF was designed under three steps.  Step 1 focused on carrying out a 
comprehensive review to identify the RFs in OGP projects in different countries and some 
of the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) used in these projects.  Step 2 used a 
questionnaire survey to analyse the RFs regarding their influence on OGP projects and to 
evaluate the RMMs based on their degrees of effectiveness to mitigate the RFs.  The 
ranking of the RFs indicated that proper attention needs to be paid to the question of what 
motivates third-party disruption to OGPs in Iraq like sabotage, terrorism and theft risks.  
Step 3 was about recommending some RMMs to mitigate the RFs in these projects based 
on the results of the survey.  The RMF and its recommendations could be used to more 
effectively manage the RFs in OGP projects in troubled countries that have just begun to 
address such risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) are a safe mode by which to transport petroleum 
products, these pipelines are still subject to several threats that cause pipe failure.  OGPs 
mainly suffer from Third-Party Disruption (TPD); corrosion; planning, design and 
construction defects; natural hazards; and operational errors (Wan and Mita, 2010).  Peng 
et al., (2016) define TPD as any accidental damage in OGPs due to external Risk Factors 
(RFs) like soil movement, surface loads that compress pipelines, natural phenomena, 
mechanical failures, or human activities near to pipelines.  Muhlbauer (2004) suggested 
that TPD also refers to any direct or indirect action that may be carried out individually, 
or by groups, to affect the safety of OGP projects - like terrorism, sabotage, theft and 
cyber-attacks on control systems.  TPD has been recognised as one of the most dominant 
causes of OGP failure globally (Wan and Mita, 2010). 
Iraq's oil reserves are the fifth-largest in the world  (EIA 2016) and its gas reserves range 
between the world’s 10th to 13th largest (IEA 2012).  Meanwhile, the inadequacies 
regarding the management of the RFs in OGP projects make pipeline failures inevitable 
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and hinder oil export activities, which results in massive economic losses to the country.  
Hence, there is a vital need to contribute to solving these highlighted crucial problems in 
Iraq and other troubled countries by employing a holistic risk management method to 
focus on the most vulnerable segments of pipeline safety.  This research, therefore, aims 
to develop a Risk Management Framework (RMF) to identify and analyse the RFs and 
Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in OGP projects more systematically and holistically 
to help the stakeholders to mitigate the RFs in these projects successfully. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
As Peng et al., (2016) observed, risk management has four steps: (1) Identify the RFs and 
RMMs.  (2) Analyse the RFs regarding their degree of influence on a project because 
dealing with each RF as if it is the most critical one results in heavy losses in terms of 
resources (Srivastava and Gupta, 2010).  (3) Respond to the risk and mitigate the 
consequences, which means to apply suitable methods to mitigate the RFs.  Therefore, it 
is significant to evaluate the RMMs regarding their degree of effectiveness.  (4) Risk 
monitoring and control, which is a continuing work-cycle of the three steps to provide up-
to-date information about the existing and new RFs and RMMs during the project's 
stages, and to ensure the project's safety. 
Effective risk mitigation requires appropriate knowledge, an up-to-date database about 
pipeline failure causes (Balfe et al., 2014), and accurate values about the probability and 
severity levels of the RFs to identify the factors which require prioritisation.  However, 
the data that the existing risk analysis methods contain is uncertain with regard to the 
probability and severity of the RFs.  For example, the data is it not available or is there a 
possibility that it is incorrect.  (Yazdani-Chamzini, 2014).  In addition, these methods are 
not accurate enough to calculate the probability of TPD risks because a historical 
database about such risk has not yet been established (Peng et al., 2016).  Moreover, these 
methods are either too generic or too specific when dealing with the RFs, as they are 
analysing only one or two RFs at the same time (El-Abbasy et al., 2016).  For example, 
studies about OGP risk in European countries mainly focus on corrosion and stress-strain 
risk.  This is because OGPs in these countries are less subject to sabotage risk because 
their pipelines are underground and in safe areas.  Researchers in the USA are focusing 
more on the terrorism risk, especially after 9/11, in addition to corrosion because OGPs in 
the USA are underground.  Studies about this topic in Africa are focusing more on the 
social factors of risk, such as sabotage and thefts.  This is related to poverty levels, as 
stolen products might be sold on the black market.  Therefore, these studies are not 
applicable in Iraq or other countries in a similar situation where the OGP network is 
aboveground, and they are subject to all of the mentioned RFs. 
Regarding the development of RMF, Mubin and Mubin (2008) developed a risk model 
for gas pipeline projects in Pakistan.  This model identifies the RFs during the 
construction stage based on analysing a number of local projects and reviews from local 
clients and contractors.  Monte Carlo simulation was used to estimate finishing the 
projects on time and budget.  The authors created a data bank to store the model's findings 
and provide recommendations for the risk management process.  Schwarz et al., (2015) 
proposed a risk management procedure to support decision-making processes in projects.  
The model started by defining the project's scope, the risk management criteria and 
identifying the RFs using checklists.  The authors used the Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) and experts’ judgements to evaluate the RFs.  These two models identify RFs only 
from local projects.  El-Abbasy et al., (2014) used a historical database and ANN to 
predict the conditions of offshore OGPs in Qatar and to prioritise the maintenance work 
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for these pipelines.  This study uses an available database to identify the RFs.  
Unfortunately, there is no such database available in developing countries, where the 
documentation is not in the best condition and there are no appropriate records about 
OGP accidents.  None of the reviewed models has identified and evaluated any RMMs to 
mitigate the RFs.  The current study adapts these models to develop a more holistic and 
applicable RMF for OGP projects in troubled countries like Iraq by bridging the 
highlighted gaps in them (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The design of the Risk Management Framework (RMF) 
From the preceding text, it is clear that effective risk management is unachievable if the 
facilities for identifying the RFs and RMMs are not at the required level, and the 
probability and severity of the RFs and the effectiveness of the RMMs are not accurately 
evaluated. 
Comprehensive investigations were carried out to identify OGP RFs in different countries 
across the world, especially in insecure ones.  These investigations helped to overcome 
the problem of lack of information about OGP failure causes in Iraq, because there is no 
database about them.  Li et al., (2016) classified factors influencing global investment in 
shale gas into five types, namely: economic, political, geological, technological and 
internal risks.  Mubin and Mubin (2008) classified RFs that obstruct the construction and 
operation of pipeline projects in Pakistan into seven types, namely: political, socio-
economical, technical, organisational, natural catastrophe, financial, safety and security, 
and environmental risks.  In the current study, in order to include OGP RFs that affect the 
general safety of OGPs in addition to the economic challenges, and to include RFs 
present during the entire project, they have been classified into five different types 
depending on their characteristics, as follows: (I) Security and Societal (S&S); (II) 
Pipeline Location (PL); (III) Health, Safety and Environment (HSE); (IV) Operational 
Constraints (OC); and (V) Rules and Regulations (R&R) risks (see Table 1). 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Developing an RMF is a part of the methodology in this paper.   Figure 1 explains the 
steps of work for this framework.  Step 1 was about identifying the RFs from the 
literature review.  Additionally, a number of RMMs were suggested to mitigate the RFs in 
OGP projects in Iraq.  These methods were classified depending on an estimate about 
when they could be applied during the projects (see Table 2).  These investigations did 
not provide any information about the probability and severity of the RFs and the 
effectiveness of the RMMs in the study area, Iraq.  Therefore, a questionnaire survey was 
needed to gather stakeholders' perceptions about them. 
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Step 2, therefore, saw the development of a questionnaire survey based on the findings 
from step 1.  A pilot survey was distributed to improve the clarity of the questions.  The 
survey was distributed using an online survey tool.  The potential respondents were 
informed that their responses would be treated confidentially.  RF probability levels were 
analysed on a scale (rare, unlikely, possible, likely and almost certain).  RF severity levels 
were analysed on a different scale (negligible, minor, moderate, major and catastrophic).  
RMM effectiveness degrees were evaluated on a further scale (ineffective, slightly 
effective, moderately effective, very effective and extremely effective).  A Likert scale 
was used in this paper because it is a commonly used scale for subjective measurements.  
This scale is sensitive and small deviations are highly meaningful (Cummins and 
Gullone, 2000).  Initially, a 7-point Likert scale was used in the pilot survey, but the 
participants observed that it was difficult for them to use.  Therefore, a 5-point scale was 
suggested for the survey.  The survey asked the participants to rank the project stages 
from 1 to 3 regarding their priority for application of the RMMs; where 1 means high 
priority and 3 means lower priority.  The respondents were asked, are the underground 
pipelines (which are subject to corrosion, geological, construction and maintenance risks) 
safer than the aboveground ones (which are subject to sabotage and theft risks) or vice 
versa? 
The values of Risk Probability (RP) and Risk Severity (RS) of each RF (Table 1) and the 
degrees of effectiveness of each RMM (Table 2) were calculated by determining the 
means of the scale.  Based on the character of the RF, some RMMs were suggested to 
mitigate the RF.  For example, avoiding insecure areas, using an anti-terrorism design, 
having protective barriers and patrols could mitigate the risk of terrorism and sabotage by 
direct action.  Meanwhile, laying the pipelines underground can help to minimise the 
opportunities for terrorists and saboteurs to attack them.  However, terrorists and vandals 
still have an opportunity to damage OGPs.  Educating government-public corporations 
about managing the safety of OGPs and reporting any case of vandalism could help to 
reduce pipeline attacks, but the government cannot entirely stop terrorists and vandals 
from attacking the pipelines.  From these examples, the RMMs were classified into direct 
and indirect RMMs in the way that the RMM(s) will mitigate the RF(s) (see Figure 2). 
RESULTS  
Before analysing the survey, it was important to test its reliability.  Cronbach’s alpha 
correlation coefficient (α) was calculated by using SPSS to test the survey's reliability 
level (Shavelson and Haertel, 2006).  The α of the survey was found to be 0.910, where 
0.7 indicates a minimum level of reliability (Pallant, 2001).  This means the results are 
reliable. 
In total, 198 respondents completed the survey: 14 were consultants, planners or 
designers; 71 were site engineers; 41 were operators; 29 were administrators; 10 were 
owners or clients; and 33 were either students (they are employers and postgraduate 
students at the same time) or lecturers in oil engineering departments at different Iraqi 
universities.  With regard to level of experience, 74 respondents have less than five years 
of experience, 67 have between five and 10 years, 29 have between 10 and 15 years, and 
28 have more than 15 years of experience.  Three respondents do not have a degree, 28 
have a high school certificate or diploma, 106 have a bachelor's degree (engineers), and 
61 have a master's degree or PhD.  The results of analysing the RFs and RMMs are 
shown in Table 1 and Table 2. 
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Table 2: RMM classification and effectiveness. 
 
Figure 2 shows the suggested RMMs to mitigate the RFs in OGP projects in Iraq.  The 
RMMs were ranked based on the survey results. 
 
Figure 2: The suggested RMMs to mitigate the RFs. 
By comparing Table 1 with Figure 2, we can see some RFs do not have any suggested 
RMMs.  Therefore, in Figure 3, more RMMs which were not mentioned in the survey 
have been suggested to mitigate the first three RFs. 
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Figure 3: The suggested RMMs from outside the survey. 
As some of the RFs shown in the above figure did not have any associated RMMs, it was 
necessary to identify more RMMs than those included in the survey (Figure 3).  As 
suggesting RMMs for RFs like corruption is beyond the authors' knowledge, these RFs 
needed to come from very high levels of government. 
The project stages were ranked regarding the priority for application of the RMMs by 
calculating the total response as follows.  1- Planning and design stage (with a total of 
1.520); 2- construction stage (with a total of 2.045); 3- operation stage (with a total of 
2.434).  As 1 indicates the highest priority, the lowest total is the top rank.  Fifty-eight out 
of 198 respondents chose aboveground as a comparatively safe pipeline network; while 
140 respondents chose underground pipelines as the safer option to transport petroleum 
products in Iraq. 
DISCUSSION  
Risk management is a continuous process of identifying and analysing the RFs, risk 
response and risk control actions.  Identifying the OGP RFs and RMMs based on a wide-
ranging review provides accurate and appropriate knowledge about the safety of 
pipelines.  Because there is no reference by which to analyse the risk factors and the risk 
mitigation methods, collecting information from various and trusted sources, i.e. 
government agencies, academic organisations and professionals (i.e. consultants, 
planners, designers, operators and researchers), ensures more verified analysis of OGP 
RFs and RMMs as the information has been gathered from field-experienced individuals.  
The respondents' demographic information enhanced the results because all the 
stakeholder categories were represented in the survey.  Collecting stakeholder perceptions 
about OGP RFs and RMMs could reduce the time and the cost of investigations into OGP 
RFs.  However, this method relies on their willingness to cooperate with the researchers, 
which is one of its disadvantages.  Analysing and ranking the RFs and RMMs helps the 
stakeholders, decision-makers and policymakers to apply sustainable RMMs and risk 
management strategy during the different stages of pipeline projects. 
Managing and mitigating the risk factors in these projects is not limited to one project 
stage.  Therefore, different risk mitigation methods were suggested to mitigate the risk 
factors during the projects' entirety.  Anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and 
cathodic protection were rated as an effective RMM because corrosion is one of the most 
common causes of OGP failure.  The disadvantage of this method is that, in addition to 
the extra cost, it may slow down pipeline construction and installation processes as 
protections need to be applied.  Applying advanced technological and professional remote 
monitoring (e.g. aerial and satellite surveillance, Global Positioning System (GPS) and 
smart camera systems) has some advantages, for example, surveying large areas of the 
pipeline network in a short period of time.  The presence of these methods could serve as 
a deterrent against TPD, providing quick risk prediction and alerts, and these methods 
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also offer the ability to exchange photos of the pipelines.  However, these methods also 
have disadvantages including high capital investment for equipment, machinery and 
operational costs, and additional training for personnel on new software.  Foot and 
vehicle patrols are less effective RMMs as they are very time consuming, do not cover 
large areas of the OGP network and need to be carried out at frequent intervals to be 
effective.  That said, this method has some advantages like only requiring a moderate 
capital investment for equipment and machinery, and it is effective against TPD during 
inspection periods. 
Ranking the RFs based on an RI method has some limitations.  For example, the RF with 
a high RS value could be considered as a critical RF that needs urgent mitigation work.  
However, the same RF does not achieve a high rank if it has a low RP or vice versa.  This 
means the RI method does not adequately reflect the criticality of the risks.  This study 
has other limitations, such as the RMF cannot be used to link the RFs or draw OGP 
failure scenarios and calculate the consequences of any hazardous event.  Also, it does not 
provide a decision support tool that has an automated system to analyse the information 
(e.g. RFs, RP, RS, RMMs and the effectiveness of RMMs). 
The RMF could be applied to mitigate the RFs for other critical infrastructures like water 
supply network; transportation system (e.g. railway, high ways, fuel supply, etc.); energy 
supply infrastructure (e.g. transmission and distribution lines, nuclear power generators, 
etc.); telecommunication and communication facilities; etc.  The RFs may be different in 
these projects, but insecure situations cause similar types of risks.  Therefore, the 
methodology of identifying and evaluating the RFs and RMMs could be similar. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is a need for an accurate evaluation of the RFs and RMMs in OGP projects, 
specifically regarding the issue of TPD, because they have not been accurately evaluated 
in the past.  The proposed RMF provides a comprehensive and systematic risk 
management approach in OGP projects for organisations that have just begun to mitigate 
OGP RFs more effectively.  In this paper, a new database has been created to store 
information about identifying and analysing the RF and RMMs. 
While the survey results identified various problems and risks that cause pipeline failure, 
TPD (such as sabotage, corruption, insecure areas, lawlessness and theft) is recognised as 
one of the most common issues obstructing OGP projects in Iraq.  In contrast, natural 
disasters and weather conditions, vehicle accidents, hacker attacks on the operating or 
control systems, and accidents involving animals are the RFs with the lowest impact on 
OGP projects in the country.  Concerning risk mitigation, anti-corrosion measures such as 
isolation and cathodic protection, laying the pipes underground, and advanced 
technological and professional remote monitoring of the RFs are the most effective 
RMMs; foot and vehicle patrols prove less effective.  The majority of participants agreed 
that moving pipelines underground is safer than having exposed ones.  In addition, they 
said that the mitigation of the RFs in OGP projects should be started at the planning and 
design stage. 
The future work of this study is as follows.  1- Use an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
to compare the influential RFs.  2- Use a neural network analysis tool to draw some pipe 
failure scenarios to estimate the consequence.  3- Conduct some interviews with experts 
to analyse the cost-effects that result from applying the RMMs in OGP projects.  4- Use 
the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) in the MATLAB toolbox to simulate the RFs as it is a 
powerful tool that deals with the uncertainty that results from the lack of data and experts' 
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judgements.  The paper's findings (RP, RS and risk ranking) will be used as inputs for the 
FIS.  The expected outputs will be a useful viewing tool for looking at RF weight, the risk 
matrix and the overall safety of pipelines.  5- Use one of the decision support methods 
that can analyse the inputs (e.g. RFs, RP, RS, RMMs, the effectiveness of RMMs and the 
cost) to help the stakeholders during the decision-making process. 
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